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Two dominant trends may be observed ¡n the 
modern history of Sweden: first, its capacity to adapt 
to changes in the international economy, and second, 
the formation of political coalitions. 
The first trend could be the necessary 
consequence of its size and the resulting dependence 
on international trade. The second has taken two 
forms: parl iamentary collaboration between 
political parties and the establishment of "electoral 
coalitions" around policies which have transcended 
class interests and appealed to groups outside the 
Government's support base. 
"Director of the Trade Union Institute for Economic 
Research (FIEF) in Stockholm. 
I 
Some thoughts on Sweden's 
modern economic history* 
There is no established theory that completely 
explains why and how economic growth begins, 
how a country goes from widespread poverty to 
well-being, even abundance. 
In Sweden, researchers can point to some 
interesting features of the country's remarkable 
development in the last century and can identify 
the typical changes which have taken place in its 
economic structure during the transition from 
stagnation to sustained growth. 
The decade of the 1880s is usually mentioned 
as decisive for Sweden's "take-off". At that time, 
a series of Swedish inventions and —especially, 
perhaps— the re-working and development of 
foreign innovations were applied to industrial 
production. Some examples are skimmers (Alfa 
Laval), telephones (LM Ericsson), electric 
motors (ASEA). In many cases, moreover, 
something unusual occurred —the inventors and 
innovators were also entrepreneurs, qualities 
rarely seen in the same person. The 
entrepreneurial conglomerates that arose at the 
end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth century still dominate Swedish 
industry today. The exception is Volvo —the 
largest enterprise in Sweden— which was 
founded later. 
This was the time when Sweden made 
enormous capital gains in a short time. Different 
technical and chemical discoveries made it 
possible to exploit natural resources which had 
remained practically untouched until then. The 
Bessemer or Thomas process allowed the 
purification of iron ore from the north of 
Sweden, which was characterized by its high 
concentration of phosphorus. Paper production 
based on wood pulp was begun almost at the 
same time. All of a sudden, phosphorus minerals 
and forests —resources that Sweden possessed 
•Work presented to the seminaron "Development,democracy and 
equity: the experience of Sweden and Latin America", jointly 
organized by liCLAC's Social Development Division and the 
International Centre of the Swedish Worker Movement and held 
in Santiago, Chile, 29-31 May 1989. 
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in enormous quantities— were transformed into 
economic wealth. As a result, Sweden's terms of 
trade improved notably. 
During the 1870s, almost 70% of the popu-
lation worked in agriculture. A process of rapid 
industrialization began in the next decade; a 
large percentage of the total labour force was 
employed in industry, a trend which continued 
up to the mid-1960s. 
Sweden has a history of remarkable eco-
nomic growth. From 1870 onwards, per capita 
income grew at an annual rate of 2.5 %, i.e., 0.5 % 
faster than the United States, Norway and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. This growth rate 
is only surpassed by Japan, whose per capita 
income grew at an annual rate of 2.7%. 
Japan and Sweden differ from the other 
countries mentioned in that they both grew 
rapidly in the years between the two world wars 
and after 1945. Many other countries distin-
guished themselves by growing rapidly in one of 
those periods, but not in both. 
Are there any decisive reasons for this phe-
nomenon? Economic historians have identified 
some factors that could help explain the success-
ful history of Swedish growth: 
a) Between 1850 and 1919, a fourth of the 
Swedish population —1.2 million people—emi-
grated, almost exclusively to the United States. 
Thus, the country was freed from rural poverty 
with its sequels of hunger and massive unem-
ployment, and the economic burden on the pop-
ulation employed in agriculture was significantly 
lightened. The density of capital (amount of 
capital per inhabitant) as well as the ratio of land 
per inhabitant rose steeply. Although GNP cer-
tainly fell because of the emigration, per capita 
GNP increased considerably. 
b) During the 1880s, international demand, 
combined with the inventions and innovations 
already mentioned, gave Sweden enormous 
wealth. The forests and minerals were deve-
loped and became much more valuable than the 
petroleum deposits in the North Sea were for 
the United Kingdom and Norway during the 
1960s and 1970s. This brought about the already 
mentioned improvement in the terms of trade. 
c) Sweden stayed out of both world wars. It 
kept its productive apparatus intact and was able 
—after those conflagrations— to produce in 
order to meet an inexhaustible demand during 
the respective reconstruction periods. The den-
sity of capital remained relatively high. 
d) Unlike other countries, Sweden estab-
lished as priority objectives —through its eco-
nomic policy— a high level of employment and a 
high use of installed capacity, thus avoiding 
sharp and prolonged depressions. The deep and 
lengthy depression of the 1930s, which had dis-











































































Source: Osten Johansson, 1967, The Gross Domestic Product of Sweden and its Composition I961-I96Í, Stockholm, SCB, 
Nutionalrekenskaper (Central Bureau of Statistics, National Accounts); Willi Bergstrom, \9(>9,Den ekonomiska politiken i Sverige 
itch dcss verkiiiitfU'f (licoitomic policy in Sweden and its effects). 
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States, followed a much more moderate trend in 
Sweden, thanks to the application of a successful 
economic policy. In this way, both GNP and per 
capita GNP have been maintained at levels 
higher than those of many other countries. 
To sum up, to succeed a country must accum-
ulate capital, avoid wars and maintain a high and 
stable level of employment. 
We can also ?.dd —keeping in mind the 
pioneer era at the end of last century— that it is 
to a country's advantage to conduct a bold and 
extensive campaign of industrial "spying" 
abroad. Frankly, this explains many of Sweden's 
industrial successes from the beginning. 
To tell the truth, it should also be pointed out 
that Sweden avoided to a large extent the heavy 
burden of external debt contracted at the end of 
last century. From the outset, it took out large 
foreign loans to finance investments in the 
hydroelectric sector and in the construction of its 
network of railroads. These loans were paid 
throughout the 1920s with currencies highly 
devalued by inflation, so that large external 
indebtedness never became a significant 
economic burden for the country's economy. 
This somewhat brief account can be 
substantiated by a study of the national accounts 
(table 1). 
The table shows that the contribution of 
agriculture and timber to GNP dropped from 
close to 30% at the end of last century to barely 
10% in the middle of this century, and only 3% 
in 1987. Industry and construction developed in 
Industrialization created a working class and also 
launched an enormous migration from the 
countryside to the city. The urban population 
was only 13% in 1870. It reached 30% in 1920. 
This emptying of the countryside was the basis 
for the political and trade-union development of 
the worker movement. The constitution of the 
worker movement was largely a local process. 
The same people who organized the worker 
the opposite direction, with a contribution to 
GNP which rose from 27% at the end of last 
century to 50% in the 1950s, reaching its high 
point in the mid-1960s and then diminishing. 
Public administration has risen continuously 
from 3% at the beginning of the century to 23% 
in 1987. 
Exports —considered as percentage of 
GNP— remained around 20 % in the first half of 
the century, only to then reach some 37% in 
1987. Also considered as percentage of GNP, 
investments have risen constantly from the end 
of last century to the mid- 1960s, reaching a 
maximum level of 27% in 1965. The mid-1970s 
saw the beginning of one of the worse crises in 
the industrial history of Sweden. It lasted up to 
the early 1980s. Investments fell at that time to 
22% of GNP, a level where they have remained 
up till today (table 2). 
Table 2 
EXPORTS AND GROSS FIXED-CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP 
~ Gross fixed-capital Exports r 1
 investment 
1900 19 12 
1930 12 14 
1955 24 22 
1965 24 27 
1975 31 23 
1987 37 22 
Source; Table 1. 
communes and youth clubs were also members 
of the trade unions. The Social Democratic 
Worker Party of Sweden (SAP) was founded in 
April 1889, exactly 100 years ago. In the 
beginning, the central organization of the party 
also became the central organization of the 
trade-union movement. This situation was 
maintained for nine years, until the workers 
created their own trade-union organization ¡n 
II 
A new political structure 
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1989, the General Confederation of Workers of 
Sweden (LO). The nucleus of social democracy 
was made up of the members of the trade-union 
clubs, collectively associated with the party. 
The local character of the process of forming 
the party gave it a degree of stability and 
strength that contrasts with the experience of 
relatively successful modern parties, like the 
socialist parties of France and Greece. These 
were very vulnerable, because they were formed 
by a small number of people, and from above 
instead of from the grass roots. More than 
authentic mass movements, those parties were 
an organic instrument at the service of ambitious 
politicians. 
Furthermore, the Swedish trade-union 
movement managed to avoid political divisions, 
while the question of religion was never a 
problem. The great strike of 1909 led to a defeat 
and weakened the movement for several years. 
After this exper ience, the t rade-union 
movement as a whole became rather cautious in 
using the strike as a political instrument, 
although there were frequent "little strikes" on 
the federation level. With some exaggeration, 
we can affirm that after the war, the trade-union 
movement almost never struck only for wages; 
apparently, it will only strike when questions of 
principle are at stake. 
Swedish social democracy and che worker 
movement have never been distinguished as 
creators of theory. At the beginning, many ideas 
and programmes were taken over from 
Germany. By way of example, the 1920 
programme developed a rather dependent 
Marxism, which remained formally in place up 
to 1944. According to that programme, all of 
society's problems would be solved once private 
property was eliminated. The economy would be 
more efficient, the "good things of life" would be 
justly distributed, and productive resources 
would always be put to full use, with no periods 
of unemployment. 
This situation tends toward a certain 
softness, owing to the strong growth in recent 
decades of trade-union organizations of 
government employees and other employee 
organizations, which allows them to compete 
with worker unions on certain levels of the wage 
scale. At the same time, more recently created 
trade-unions lack a long tradition of trade-union 
experience. In this sense, we can speak of a 
tendency to weaken the so-called Swedish model, 
due to the fragmentation of the trade-union 
movement. 
In the "revolutionary" years of 1917-1918, 
the party faced a situation of internal struggle 
about the question of democracy. The unity and 
strength of the trade-union movement, along 
with the experience of the great strike of 1909, 
helped the reform leadership maintain control 
of most of the party. Another contributing factor 
was the previous collaboration of the party with 
the Liberals in the struggle to achieve political 
democracy. Hjalmar Branting, the first head of 
the Social Democratic Party, had been elected to 
the Parliament on a Liberal ticket, since the 
workers did not have the right to vote at that 
time. This was the first parliamentary 
representation in the history of the party. 
But very soon social democracy took over the 
government. In 1920, the only exclusively social 
democratic prime ministry in the world assumed 
control. The unilateral and simple content of the 
party's programme was naturally a big help dur-
ing the profound crisis of 1920-1921. With the 
succession of several social democratic govern-
ments, it became clear that in the field of politi-
cal practice, social democracy was reduced to 
applying the traditional monetary and fiscal pol-
icies, not unlike those that the progressive bour-
geois sectors could have promoted. It is 
pertinent to note, however, that the social demo-
cratic governments of the 1920s were minority 
HI 
The ideological tradition 
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governments, with limited possibilities of carry-
ing out an independent policy. 
However, the trade-union movement was 
growing in power, and the working class was 
gradually becoming involved in political activi-
ties. Mobilization did not come quickly. The 
working class still voted less frequently than the 
more wealthy social classes, although it was 
gradually improving. The party had the capacity 
to attract highly-talented personalities to its 
ranks. It conducted a very intense ideological 
discussion in its reviews and theoretical books; 
as a result dogmatic Marxism lost its influence in 
favour of an action-oriented pragmatism, which 
sought to raise the standard of living, achieve 
greater social equality and struggle against 
unemployment. It is difficult to exaggerate the 
negative importance of the project to raise the 
inheritance tax presented in Parliament in 1928. 
That motion, inspired by questions of principle, 
was the basis of a violent attack launched by the 
bourgeoisie against social democracy and inter-
rupted the sustained trend in the electoral pro-
gress of that party. The project lacked a real base 
in daily life, and the workers therefore did not 
appreciate how such a measure could help to 
improve their living conditions. It was a lesson 
that profoundly marked the party's action for the 
rest of the period between both world wars. To 
be successful, a policy must be perceived as rele-
vant to practical living conditions. Lines of 
action based exclusively on questions of princi-
ple and lacking a direct connection with the daily 
problems of people can lead to tremendous pol-
itical defeats. (A similar experience occurred in 
1976, when the party lost power, at the time of a 
violent attack by the bourgeoisie against the 
"wage-earners' funds", a proposal that the com-
mon citizen would have a hard time considering 
especially important.) 
A formal battle broke out in the party in 
Congress in 1932, when the decision was taken 
to abandon the policy of socialization —the offi-
cial orientation of the 1920s— as the party's 
basic line of action. It was replaced by some ideas 
on economic planning, and the question of the 
ownership of the means of production was de-
emphasized. It should be pointed out, in any case, 
that when they spoke of economic planning at 
that time, it was not much more than what today 
is called Keynesian stabilization policy. Never-
theless, it was quite advanced for those times. 
Different Swedish economists —Liberals like 
Bertil Ohlin, and Social Democrats like Gunnar 
Myrdal and Erik Lindahl —played a pioneering 
role in all this. Erik Wigforss —at that time the 
most important intellectual of the Social Demo-
cratic Party— independently assumed the new 
flow of ideas, and Sweden became "Keynesian" 
four years before the publication of the General 
Theory. 
The party began its long period in govern-
ment with the electoral victory of 1932, once the 
crisis of 1928 was overcome. 
Later historical research has shown that the new 
ideas on fiscal policy —characterized by the use 
of budget deficits in times of recession as a 
means of counteracting a decline of activity in 
the private sector— were of course "revolution-
ary", but their real quantitative effect was not too 
great. What was genuinely relevant for a rela-
tively successful short-term policy applied in 
Sweden during the crisis of the 1930s was a 
sharp depreciation of the krona, which basically 
happened by chance. Strictly speaking, this mea-
sure saved Sweden in the economic crises of 
1931, 1949 and 1982. On all those occasions, the 
country's situation was unique. This was possible 
because of its small size, which meant that as 
important as success in exporting was for 
Sweden, quantitatively speaking, it was unim-
portant in the total volume of international 
trade. 
An important element in the social demo-
cratic strategy from 1932 onward was the forma-
tion of coalitions —with different degrees of 
formality. Already before the full establishment 
of political democracy, the Social Democrats had 
collaborated with the Liberals, precisely on this 
question. In that year the Parliamentary major-
ity needed to form the government was ensured 
by the Social Democrats' acceptance of a protec-
tionist policy for agriculture. In response, the 
farmers' party supported the new fiscal and 
labour-market policies in Parliament. This stra-
tegy of collaboration had been prepared before-
hand. Already in 1930, while the party was still 
in opposition, a project had been worked out to 
relieve the situation of misery among workers 
and farmers. Almost identical sums of money 
were proposed as credits for farmers and aid for 
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workers in the labour market. From that time 
and almost permanently, the Social Democracts 
have sought the support of some bourgeois party 
to approve the important reforms proposed by 
the party. Collaboration with the farmers was 
through Parliament and even in coalition 
governments. Sweden had no social class of large 
landholders playing a political role. Farmers 
practised a family-style agriculture and lived in 
social conditions similar in many ways to those 
of the working class. 
After the war, the lower middle class and the 
farmers supported the creation of a general sys-
tem of medical insurance and more widespread 
schooling. This is an example of the electoral 
coalitions mentioned above. It would seem that 
the lower levels of the employee sectors lent 
their support to the worker movement to set up 
the pension system of the services at the end of 
the 1950s —another example of electoral coali-
Already in 1930, the party had united around a 
line of action. The State would generate employ-
ment, through the expansion of policy to the 
labour market, which would be financed with 
public indebtedness. On the level of social policy, 
transfers to households would attempt to alle-
viate poverty in different ways among workers 
and farmers. The theoretical scaffolding of the 
Stockholm School —an early variant of 
"Keynesianism"— was the work within the 
party of, among others, Gunnar Myrdal and 
Ernst Wigforss. 
In practice, the ideology of socialization had 
been abandoned and replaced by a kind of ideol-
ogy of planning. Instead of socializing capital 
stock, a long period was begun of socializing 
income flows, with the aim of producing a range 
of living conditions different from those pro-
duced by the free play of market forces. This is 
reflected in the coefficient of taxes, which has 
risen constantly since 1930, as well as in the 
increase in public expenditures for consumption 
and transfers (see table 3). 
tion. The exception was the above-mentioned 
question of the "wage-earners' funds", i.e., the 
creation of a system of capital funds by shares, 
owned collectively by wage-earners and financed 
by dues on wages and income tax. On that ques-
tion, the Social Democracts failed to form an 
electoral coalition, and the results are well 
known. This project contributed to the Social 
Democrats' loss of power in 1976. 
It should be pointed out that collective funds 
many times superior were created in relation to 
the establishment of the additional pension sys-
tem (ATP). Also at that time —at the end of the 
1950s— there was a violent political battle over 
the "socialist funds". However, the Swedish 
worker movement managed to win that battle, 
because the creation of the collective capital 
funds was organically linked to a social reform 
with much wider support: the subsistence of all 
citizens in their old age. 
The objective of public expenditures for con-
sumption was distribution. With the slogan 
"Only the best is good enough for the people", it 
was proposed that health care and education 
should also be provided and administered by the 
Table 3 
TRANSFERS TO HOUSEHOLDS, PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE FOR CONSUMPTION 
AND INVESTMENT, AND TOTAL 
































Source: Table 1. 
IV 
The policy developed 
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public sector for the benefit of the population as 
a whole; that the quality of these services should 
be sufficiently high to gain the approval of the 
middle classes; that the State should not be con-
cerned only about the poor; and that private 
services could also be provided to meet the 
demand of the middle and upper classes. 
With this plan, the different groups of citi-
zens would receive something for their taxes. In 
this way, high taxes would be more acceptable 
than if the middle classes had to pay taxes to 
provide different services and a social safety net 
to the poorer sectors of society. This ideological 
foundation still exists in the welfare society and 
it has probably contributed to the fact that the 
Swedes, in spite of everything, have accepted the 
highest taxes in the world. 
This social democratic policy has been heav-
ily attacked on several occasions. It has been 
called a vicious circle, where everybody pays 
taxes first, and then has them given back in the 
form of pensions, allowances for children, hous-
ing subsidies, etc. Nevertheless, the Social 
Democratic Party has maintained its conviction 
about this policy, originally formulated by Gus-
tav Mòller in the mid-1930s. 
Table 3 shows the evolution of taxes, 
transfers to households, as well as public expen-
ditures for consumption and investment. The 
growing degree of socialization of social income 
also is clearly shown. The coefficient of taxation 
has risen from 20% in 1950 to 55% in 1987. 
Transfers rose from 6% of GNP in 1950 to 
almost 20% in 1987, while public expenditure 
grew in the same period from 15% to 30%. At 
the same time, however, around 90% of the 
productive apparatus remained in private hands. 
1. Corporate taxes 
Corporate taxes have been a peculiarity of Swed-
ish development since the end of the 1930s. The 
nominal rate of taxes on earnings has been high, 
between 40% and 55%. However, enterprises 
have been allowed to deduct capital investments 
from their taxes, which have far surpassed the 
amount corresponding to wear and depreciation. 
In the same way, the rules for assessing inven-
tory have been very generous. This has made it 
possible for enterprises —through investments 
and capital accumulation— to create a level of 
deductions which has allowed them to reduce 
their effective tax base. Thus, recently, for exam-
ple, the nominal tax rate on earnings has been 
above 50%, while the real level has varied from 
10% to 35%. This system of corporate taxes has 
stimulated capital investment and provides a 
powerful incentive to "sow" earnings by invest-
ing, which at the same time makes it possible to 
lower tax payments. When enterprises decide to 
pass along earnings in the form of dividends to 
shareholders they are counted as additional 
income, which means that in the end between 
70% and 85 % of those dividends must be paid as 
a marginal tax. This system has greatly stimu-
lated economic growth, which is why it has 
remained in place for so long. 
2. Labour-market policy 
Gosta Rehn, one of the authors of the Swedish 
labour-market policy, is participating in the 
seminar and is going to speak on this subject. I 
would only like to point out that the wage-
earners of Sweden have always had a relatively 
positive attitude towards structural changes in 
the productive apparatus and the redistribution 
of resources from low-productivity sectors to 
high-productivity sectors. Table 1 illustrates the 
structural changes recorded. 
In many other countries, the working class 
has opposed technological changes and modifi-
cations of the structure. Similar attitudes are also 
found in Sweden, but they have never been a real 
obstacle to the renovation of the productive 
apparatus. This is partially due to the policy 
applied in the labour market. Re-education, 
transfer allowances, relocation of the labour 
force, along with the creation of temporary 
work, have been the usual ingredients of this 
policy. Sweden provides more resources for this 
active labour-market policy than any other 
industrialized country, which has certainly con-
tributed to a higher degree of acceptance of 
structural changes and technological renovation. 
Even more important, however, has been the 
fact that the Swedish working class has known 
since 1932 that the Government's top priority 
has been the goal of full employment. On the 
contrary, between 1976 and 1982, structural ren-
ovation was resisted, precisely when the econ-
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omy was in crisis and unemployment was 
increasing. It is difficult to exaggerate the impor-
tance of an economic policy that gives priority to 
full employment. It creates security, even in peri-
ods of change. 
Finally, we should point out how the wage 
policy of the trade-union movement has com-
bined with the labour-market policy and rein-
forced the tendency to stimulate capital 
accumulation, as mentioned with respect to cor-
porate taxes. The trade-union movement, and 
especially the General Confederation of 
Workers of Sweden (LO) —which organizes 
workers and other manual labourers— main-
tains the principle of "a policy of wage solidar-
ity". Originally this meant "equal work, equal 
pay", independently of individual enterprises' 
level of earnings and capacity to pay wages. A 
The observations formulated about the eco-
nomic history of contemporary Sweden could be 
summarized in two main characteristics: 
a) Exports have been the dynamic factor of 
economic growth in Sweden, with a productive 
apparatus faced with growing international 
competition. Exports have generated the resour-
ces needed for financing the considerable growth 
of. the public sector. 
policy like this speeds up the process of change, 
since it does not allow inefficient enterprises to 
survive by paying low wages. 
Later the expression "policy of wage solidar-
ity" represented the efforts made by the trade-
union movement to raise the level of lower 
wages, and the practice of a moderated ambition 
with respect to raising higher wages. This policy 
helped eliminate the more inefficient enter-
prises, while the more efficient ones can reach a 
high level of earnings and experience rapid 
growth, thanks to moderate wage demands and 
the benefits obtained from the tax policy. Differ-
ent scientific investigations of the wage struc-
ture unanimously stress the great importance of 
the trade-union movement's wage policy and 
agree that the practical effects of that policy have 
been basically consistent with its intentions. 
b) Sweden has had a democratic régime 
since the 1920s. Democracy was attained peace-
fully. Thanks to it, social peace and a broad 
consensus in the citizenry have been preserved, 
which were also facilitated by the ethnic, politi-
cal and religious homogeneity of the Swedish 
people. 
V 
Conclusions 
